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$OWKRXJK WKH VHFRQG KDOI RI WKH WZHQWLHWK FHQWXU\ VDZ WKH ULVH DQG IDOO RI µPXOWL-flag 
FRPSDQLHV¶LQWKHFLYLODYiation industry, our understanding of how some managed to buck 
the trend and achieve longevity remains limited. This paper advances business history and 
strategic management research by examining the strategic renewal activities of 
Scandinavian Airlines (formerly Scandinavian Airlines System) during the period 1946-
2012. The study sheds light on the key roles of private and state owners, rivals as well as 
banks, in critical financial phases are discussed in terms of longevity in the company. The 
longevity oI WKH EXVLQHVV VWHPV IURP WKH OHDGHUV¶ DELOLW\ WR GHYHORS DV DQWLFLSDWHG DQG
respond to change in their competitive arena in close interaction with the owners. Thus, 
incumbent firms that strategically renew themselves prior to or during market reform, such 
as deregulation, enhance their chances of developing the size of their networks and revenue 
streams. Our main contribution to business history and strategic management literatures is 
the development of context-specific stages, which shed light on the evolution of strategic 
renewal activities and shifts from older processes and routines towards customer service 
and efficiency.    




According to the development models of the civil aviation industry from a historical 
perspective, the most common feature of the industry was the manifestation RI µIO\LQJ WKH
IODJ¶1  This is where countries designated airlines to operate on its behalf and represent that 
nation. This often means the nation plays a pivotal role in building and development of the 
airline. One of the less well-known characteristics of the second half of the twentieth century 
ZDVWKHULVHDQGIDOORIµPXOWL-IODJFRPSDQLHV¶0)&VDPRQJFLYLODYLDWLRQairlines.2 MFCs 
DUHILUPVWKDWDUHµMRLQWO\RZQHGDQGRSHUDWHG¶E\WZRRUPRUHQDWLRQV3 The emergence of 
such firms over the course of the century exemplifies the making of the global civil aviation 
industry, which was heavily influenced by state subsidies, regulations, management and then 
the joint ownership of airlines.4  
Nevertheless, by the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century, the most well-
known MFCs such as Air Afrique and West African Airways Corporation have either 
collapsed or disintegrated.5 Despite the departures of such firms, very few of such MFCs 
have survived in the face of turbulence in the business environment. Today, Scandinavian 
Airlines (formerly Scandinavian Airlines System, SAS) remains the only long-time surviving 
and important multi-flag airline in the civil aviation industry. The issue of how SAS has been 
able to renew itself over time and across events is important in enriching our understanding 
of international business history and strategic renewal literature.  
Although strategic renewal has been identified as an essential ingredient for sustained 
organisational success, past studies have largely overlooked how organisations renew 
themselves and develop new business model to achieve longevity.6 Indeed, the business 
history and strategic management scholars that could provide further insight on the roles and 
effects of organisational decision-makers in influencing the strategic directions and renewal 
of their organisations over time, have largely overlooked the subject within the field of civil 
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aviation history. Although some studies have examined some airlines with a long history e.g. 
Singapore Airlines7, the issue of strategic renewal over time remains largely overlooked in 
the literature. Our primary purpose in this article is to examine the historical trajectory of 
VXFKILUPV¶VWUDWHJLFUHQHZDODFWLRQVDQGKRZWKHy are able to achieve longevity in the face of 
environmental turbulence. Specifically, we focus on the case of Scandinavian Airlines to 
examine how the firm has been able to achieve longevity from 1946 to 2012. Although the 
SAS Group includes other activities, our analysis focuses mainly on the airline business. 
Our choice of SAS as an exemplar case firm for the study is made on a number of 
grounds. First of all, since its formation in 1946, the firm has been owned by three 
Scandinavian states (i.e. Denmark, Norway and Sweden). It remains one of the extremely few 
cases of MFCs that have survived whilst concurrently addressing the conflicting interests of 
more than one nation. Indeed, the European airline sector in which this firm partly operates 
has seen fundamental changes such as liberalisation and privatisation of state-owned airlines 
62$V IURP WKH V ZKLFK KDYH DOWHUHG WKH ILUP¶V ODQGVFDSH DQG WULJJHUed a range of 
strategic renewal actions. Despite the increasing assertion that such state-owned firms are 
unlikely to achieve success and therefore government should redirect their investments 
elsewhere8, SAS has bucked the trend and achieved longevity. Therefore, there is a need to 
examine the strategic renewal activities of the firm to enhance our understanding of the 
concept. The focus is on its adaptation in the period following the re-regulation of the market 
in the 1980s.   
This paper offers key contributions to business history and strategic management 
literature. First, the study integrates insights of the organisational adaptation and 
environmental selection perspectives of strategic renewal to develop an evolutional stage 
model of how strategic renewal initiatives evolved. Thus, this deepens our understanding of 
how decision-makers shape the direction of their organisations. In addition, notwithstanding 
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the growing body of scholarly works on strategic renewal9, our understanding of how firms 
renew and respond to environmental upheavals remains limited. Our study enriches the 
resource-based view10 and strategic renewal11 literatures on how firms renew their resource 
base in the face of environmental upheavals.  
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. In the next section, we present a review 
of the literature on strategic renewal and business longevity. We then illustrate our analysis 
using the case of SAS. We conclude by outlining the implications for business history, 
strategic renewal and business longevity literature.  
Strategic renewal and business longevity: an integrated review 
%XVLQHVV ORQJHYLW\FDQEHYLHZHGDVD ILUP¶VDELOLW\ WR UHQHZLQ WKH IDFHRIHQYLURQPHQWDO
upheavals to prolong its existence.12 Strategic renewal refers to any activities or actions that a 
firm undertakes which modify its path dependence.13 In other words, strategic renewal 
encompasses actions and decisions taken by a firm to achieve business longevity.  Prior 
research has shown that strategic renewal entails a shift from the µold ways of doing things¶ 
and replacing obsolete routines, processes and procedures to eliminate waste and allow 
efficiency to flourish across the whole organisation.14 Strategic renewal has an inherent 
notion that strategic directions of firms are evolutionary in nature, which is accomplished 
over time.15 It has been suggested that business longevity partly stems from effective 
adoption and implementation of strategic renewal initiatives in a timely manner.16  
Research on strategic renewal has been shaped by two schools of thought: 
organisational adaptation and environmental selection.17 These theories have been adopted to 
shed light on the interactions between firm-level and external factors in influencing strategic 
renewal activities. The adaptation school of thought argues that organisations have inherent 
abilities and possess key assets to be able to craft an effective strategy and chart a new course 
to respond to threats and opportunities in their environment.18 The perspective focuses on the 
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fit between a firm and its environment over time.19 There is mounting evidence that an ability 
to identify and respond to changes in the business environment is an essential element for 
business longevity.20 Organisations that proactively scan their environments stand a better 
chance of mitigating the risk of failure and achieving longevity.  
Another theory under this umbrella is the resource-based view of business longevity21 
which argues that it is the development, accumulation and utilisation of unique resources and 
FDSDELOLWLHVZKLFKXQGHUSLQDILUP¶VDELOLW\WRDFKLHYHprofitability and longevity. Stemming 
from this is the suggestion that ILUP¶V UHVRXUFHV FDQ EH FRQVLGHUHG DV SDUW RI WKH VWUDWHJLF
renewal literature. In a similar vein, the dynamic capability perspective22 suggests that 
RUJDQLVDWLRQV¶ DELOLW\ WR GHYHORS UHQHZ DQG XSJUDGH WKHLU UHVRXUFHV DQG FDSDELOLWLHV LQ D
timely manner is essential in achieving a sustainable competitive edge and prolonging their 
existence.23 Indeed, the ability to innovate has been uncovered as essential in ensuring the 
long-term survival of a business.24 For instance, the Shinise (long-lived Japanese companies) 
have been found to µfocus on a central belief or credo that is not tied solely to making a 
profit¶ and pursue a strategy that circumvents mergers and acquisitions in sharp contrast to 
their counterparts in other advanced economies and therefore avoid being absorbed or 
dissolved by larger rivals.25  
2Q WKH RWKHU KDQG WKH VHOHFWLRQ SHUVSHFWLYH FRQWHQGV WKDW RUJDQLVDWLRQV¶ DELOity to 
achieve renewal in the face of changes in their business environment is constrained by 
environmental factors such as market forces.26 This view contends that managers play little or 
no role in shaping the survival of their organisations. This strand of research suggests that 
market forces such as deregulation, technological breakthroughs and liberalisation may alter 
the competitive environment leading to the emergence of new firms and disappearance of 
those that are unable to adapt in a timely manner.27  In a related but distinct area, the concept 
of state owned companies is relevant in this context. Historically, state-owned enterprises 
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were designed to cater for the public interest at the expense of profitability28. Recent studies 
have demonstrated that multi-state owned companies are often established to allow nations to 
pool together their limited financial and human resources29.  However, the general focus on 
serving the public interest often constrain decision-PDNHUV DQG PDQDJHUV¶ DELOLW\ WR PDNH
necessary changes to respond to  external environmental factors30.  
$QRWKHU UHOHYDQW VWUHDP RI UHVHDUFK DQFKRUHG LQ WKH XSSHU HFKHORQV¶ SHUVSHFWLYH31 
contends that strategic renewal activities stem from the characteristics of top-management 
teams. Top-management team characteristics such as functional and educational background, 
willingness to take risk and initiate change, decisiveness and level of expertise play a critical 
role in shaping the renewal activities of their firms.32 One line of research has suggested that 
firms that are unable to meet the expectations of many of their stakeholders such as 
governments, owners and customers are more likely to lose their support and patronage 
which then threatens their ability to survive.33 There is a hint at the possibility that 
organisations that are able to gain support of owners or stakeholders to overcome short-term 
loss-making operations have a better chance of ensuring their long-term survival. Some 
studies have shown that the longevity of firms to a certain extent is determined by the 
existence of a symbiotic relationship to banks and owners, including rescue credits, bank 
account deposits, interlocking directorates, capital injections, expertise and individual trust.34 
It also follows that organisations that rely on the state for funding have historically found 
help to overcome the pressures to make profit and reverse loss-making operations.35  
It is contended that strategic renewal entails both the adaptation and selection 
features.36 Strategic renewal is seen as a process with µan ongoing journey instead of a 
discrete shift from one state to another¶.37 This process entails the interactions both firm-level 
and external factors in influencing the decisions and strategic direction. In this direction, 
strategic renewal entails two key processes/components: discontinuous strategic 
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transformations and incremental renewal.38 The incremental strategic renewal suggests that 
strategic renewal is a small step-by-step approach in which a firm initiates and implements 
ideas and actions over time. The minor changes often take place in a timely manner which 
mitigates the need to engage in larger and more difficult change subsequently.39 On the other 
hand, the discontinuous transformations entail a major attempt at discarding and replacing 
NH\DVSHFWVRIWKHILUP¶VVWUDWHJ\LQDQDWWHPSWWRHQKDQFHORQJ-term prospects.40 One of the 
motives for employing this approach is to help understand how some firms overcome 
declining growth or maturity in an industry by seeking to exploit new market opportunities. 
As firms develop and renew, they exhibit elements of both types of strategic renewal.  
To sum up, our review of these theoretical strands show the importance of deepening 
our knowledge by combining these theoretical contributions and discuss them in a historical 
business history perspective. Having set out the current state of knowledge, we now turn to 
the data collection method. 
Method and data 
Given that how µPXOWL-IODJ FRPSDQLHV¶ XQGHUWDNH strategic renewal activities and achieve 
longevity remains largely overlooked, we rely on a single case study approach to provide a 
more in-depth analysis and robust explanations of the subject.41  In addition, the lifespan and 
scope of the analysis led us to adopt multiple approaches to data collection. These include 
archival annual reports and interviews. We consulted the annual reports and SAS archives 
over the period to glean useful information. One of the authors had total access to the SAS 
archives until the year 2000, while another author had access to the SILA archives in the 
Wallenberg family archives, SAS archives as well as the ABA archives (National Archives of 
Sweden), although there should not be a bias towards the Swedish stake in SAS. Indeed, such 
archival records are µparticularly suited to generating developmental explanations «
explaining processes of change and evolution¶.42  
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Regarding access to these archival materials, they were obtained through methods 
such as networking and snowballing approach. Indeed, some studies have demonstrated that 
these approaches are particularly effective when using corporate elites as informants.43 In 
addition, other secondary sources such as academic journals, trade and industry journals, 
business magazines and books on the company were also consulted, which led to the 
identification of key events in the evolution of the company. In addition to the archival data, 
one of the authors conducted interviews with 17 persons representing the board, management 
and the labour unions within SAS, as part of a large project on SAS and the transformation of 
the Nordic airlines. The interviews paved the way for us to gain better understanding and 
clearer picture of the decision-making process and various strategies adopted over the years. 
Scandinavian Airlines System: The making of a multi-flag airline  
SAS remains one of the relatively few surviving MFCs in the 21st century global civil 
aviation industry. The development of the airline in the 20th century civil aviation in 
Scandinavia can be largely attributed to the entrepreneurial skills of private enterprises in the 
mid-1920s.44 The airline emerged from a joint arrangement of the operations of Aktiebolaget 
Aerotransport (ABA) of Sweden, Det Danske Luftartselskab (DDL) of Denmark and Det 
Norske Luftfartselskap (DNL) of Norway.45 In the 1930s, the plan for collaborative 
transatlantic air services by the three independent Scandinavian companies ± ABA, DDL and 
DNL ± was disrupted by the Nazi invasion of Denmark and Norway.46 The co-operation 
between these firms was partly precipitated by the need to pool their limited resources to help 
make the introduction of inter-country flights financially viable.47 Although World War II 
stifled progress in the sector following the occupation of Norway and Denmark, minimal 
developments continued LQ6ZHGHQJLYHQWKHFRXQWU\¶VQHXWUDOSRVLWLRQ48  
In Sweden, the privately owned firm SILA was founded in 1943, owned and 
controlled by the Wallenberg financial family. The establishment of the firm was the result of 
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a political process, where the Swedish government needed a new instrument in order to 
negotiate with the Americans during the war in order to prepare intercontinental airlines after 
the war. Thus, Sweden had established the state-owned ABA as well as the privately owned 
SILA. The companies operating in the Scandinavian countries µsecretly¶ took minor steps 
towards the consortium, which was fully resurrected after the war. After the war, it was clear 
that future development in the industry would require collaboration between nations and 
visionary industrialists to provide the level of resources needed to sustain operations in the 
global industry. On 27 June 1945, a few weeks after the collapse of the Nazi regime in 
Germany, ABA and SILA inaugurated their transatlantic service to New York from 
Stockholm.49 Consequently, the collaborative efforts and pooling of resources together led to 
the formation of SAS in 1946 as a tri-national flag airline. The negotiations between the 
Scandinavian countries were dramatic and Mr Marcus Wallenberg is considered to have 
played an important role in the negotiations.50 The pan-Scandinavian airline was owned by 
the three national airlines controlled by the nations of Denmark, Norway and Sweden, 
respectively.51 Thus, both private interests and the states were represented in the new 
company SAS. Sweden had 3/7, Denmark 2/7 and Norway 2/7 in terms of ownership shares 
in SAS. It emerged as the airline representing the three Scandinavian countries.  
Embryonic phase and late stage development 
During the embryonic stage of the firm in the 1940s and 1950s, most activities focused on the 
acquisition of aeroplanes to help launch new routes. For instance, in 1945 seven Douglas DC-
4 Skymaster aeroplanes were acquired prior to the official announcement of the SAS 
Consortium, which paved the way for one to be used on the official inaugural flight to New 
York a few weeks after its formation.52 In addition, they also converted American B-17 
bombers to civil versions. At this stage, the µmajority of managers were engineers and experts 
on various technological matters related to air travel, often with a background from the air 
force industry or the national air traffic authorities¶.53 A year after the airline was founded in 
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1946, it carried over 18,000 passengers over the Atlantic which was ahead of the projected 
3,675 passengers for the period, 10,000 passengers projected for 1952 and 16,200 projected 
to achieve by 1955.54 The first financial statement for the period 1 August 1 1946 to 31 
December 1947 demonstrated that the firm made an operating profit of $1.6 million and sales 
of $7.4 million.55 One of the defining moments in the making of SAS¶V modern history was 
the negotiation during the late 1940s and the signing of the agreement between the three 
Scandinavian countries in early 1950 (Consortium Agreement). Indeed, the distribution and 
nationality of employees, job opportunities, top management positions, and investments had 
to follow the mutual owner condition, i.e. 2-2-3 stakes of ownership for Denmark, Norway 
and Sweden56. This agreement was sometimes taken advantage of for national (political) 
interests, rather than providing a basis for cost-effectiveness. Since the organisation opted to 
hold on to this key of distribution even when the market was fully exposed to competition in 
the 1990s, SAS had many drawbacks and cost disadvantages compared to other airlines, 
without historical anchors deeply rooted in the monopoly days. Sjögren argues that this 
agreement was important in terms of path dependence since this document was constraining 
the flexibility of SAS, even after the market became deregulated. For example, ministers had 
an impact on decisions taken even in the late 1990s, as part of a continuous struggle to protect 
domestic interests and keep up employment figures nationally.57 From the 1960s, the airline 
expanded its geographical scope and reach.  
Another important and critical moment was the introduction of the jet engine. Due to the 
large sums needed for investments, negotiations between the private owners as well as the 
Scandinavian governments were intensive. SAS, like other large companies, adopted a 
mainly organic growth strategy in the 1970s. In 1965, SAS became one of the pioneering 
airlines with the introduction of electronic reservation systems. This was an incremental shift 
from the traditional system at the time which focused mainly on paperwork, towards greater 
involvement of electronics in not only reservations but also revenue management and 
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bookings in the subsequent decades. As SAS grew and its operations expanded across 
national borders, there was a shift from the over-reliance on managers who were engineers 
towards professional managers to help revitalise the airline. From 1946±2001, the firm had 
12 presidents, although some of them were only acting temporarily during the process of 
recruiting the next CEO (see Appendix 1). 
Another factor that threatened the profitability of the firm has been the recurring 
negotiations with the trade unions in the three Scandinavian countries (up to 40 separate 
unions). Despite a long history of industrial disputes, in 2006 and May 2007 by striking 
Swedish flight attendants, the firm moved towards a new arrangement which emphasised 
decentralisation and processes which allowed negotiations between the parties to move 
quickly.58 The stable revenue streams prior to deregulation and liberalisation meant that 
employees were party to generous benefits schemes and conditions. As more competition 
emerged, the model became increasingly difficult and costly to sustain. Appendix 2 
summarises key events in the evolution of the firm and strategic actions. The long tenure 
helped to improve the competitiveness of the airline relative to rivals. By the early 1980s it 
was well established that more strategic renewal actions were needed to infuse new spirit into 
the organisation. The business conditions provided the necessary incentives for the top-
management team to develop and implement long-term plans for the business.  
Our analysis led to the identification of other major and minor distinct strategic 
renewal initiatives from 1946±2012 (see Figure 1). Our analysis provides insights into the 
role of governments, the private owners (especially the Wallenberg family), top-management 
WHDPV¶ LQLWLDWLYHV DQG OLQHPDQDJHUV DV WKHRUJDQLVDWLRQ WUDQVLWLRQHG IURPRQe phase to the 
next in its quest to ensure longevity and strategic renewal concurrently. Below, we explicate a 
number of other strategic renewal actions that were undertaken.  
------------------------------ 
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Insert Figure 1 about here 
------------------------------ 
Overview of the airline industry in Europe  
The global airline industry has experienced a range of reforms including those stemming 
from the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation in 194459. However, it was not 
until the 1980s when the passing of the Single European Act in 1986 ushered in one of the 
most fundamental changes in Europe. The reform was introduced in three packages aimed at 
liberalising air transport markets and helping European Community airlines overcome the 
bureaucratic and costly process of obtaining bilateral agreements between nations. This was a 
major step towards establishing the Single European Aviation Market.60 The introduction of 
the packages started in 1987 with the First Package which paved the way for airlines to be 
able to increase their capacities on the routes between two European Union (EU) countries.  
In July 1990, the Second Package was adopted.61 A key premise of this reform was to 
ease airport constraints and allow multiple designations of airlines on routes above certain 
traffic density. The Third Package in 1992 provided airlines with equal access to licences in 
different member states. One of the main pillars of the reform was to allow cross-border 
majority ownership of airlines within the EU and remove ownership restrictions to takeovers 
within the EU. This was accompanied by a wave of cross-border acquisition and alliance as 
firms strived to gain new sources of competitive advantage. The incremental approach to 
liberalisation provided the much needed triggers for the firms to initiate reforms and respond 
to the hostility stemming from the external environment. One of the unique features of the 
reform was the compliance of Norway to the EU rules even though the country was not an 
EU member at the time.62 The prime motive was partly to allow SAS to be able to obtain 
status as an EU airline which could then be utilised as a springboard for further expansion 
across the European market.  
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The pre-liberalisation environment provided SAS with some kind of comfort zone in 
the Scandinavian countries to grow its business as well as enjoy a monopoly power over key 
routes. Although SAS lost its preferential status in the intra-Scandinavian routes connecting 
the capital cities63, the opportunities of being part of a much larger market far outweighed the 
benefits inherent in being situated in mainly the Scandinavian region.64 In 1992, a visionary 
strategy was formulated and announced µSAS to be one of five airlines in 1995¶ in which it 
was projected to become amongst a handful of surviving European airlines operating in the 
industry by the mid-1990s.65 Interestingly enough, at the time, the firm was confident that it 
would become one of the only five airlines capable of surviving the effects of the 
liberalisation reforms in the air-transport industry. However, what emerged from the 
liberalisation reforms were intense competition and the emergence of new airlines. The last 
wave of reforms was accompanied by privatisation of SOAs paving the way for new sources 
of competition to emerge. As a direct outcome of the reforms, the industry became dominated 
by privately owned airlines.  
$OWKRXJKPDQ\RI(XURSH¶VOHJDF\DLUOLQHVKDve been fully privatised, SAS remains 
one of the very few state-controlled flag carriers which have survived in an environment 
characterised by liberalisation and a shift towards privately owned firms. Further, we would 
like to emphasise that SAS is characterised by the special ownership structure, with both 
private and state ownership (50/50). Notably, the Wallenberg family has been an active long-
term owner with board representation since the foundation.66 Accompanying liberalisation in 
Europe were reforms in the Scandinavian markets. Norway followed suit by easing 
restrictions on the domestic markets in 1994, then Denmark also deregulated in 1995, thereby 
ushering in a new competitive landscape in the three countries.67 As the deregulation took 
root in the mid-V LW EHFDPH DSSDUHQW WKDW WKH FRQGLWLRQV WKDW KDG VXVWDLQHG 6$6¶V
operations in the previous regime were no longer sustainable for the era. The deregulation 
and liberalisation reforms forced the firm to respond by altering the generous terms and 
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conditions enjoyed by employees. However, the resistance from pilots and cabin attendants to 
agree on less favourable labour contracts was massive, and this manifested itself in many 
strikes.  
Since there was less possibility of reducing employee costs, management turned the 
focus to organisational and strategy manoeuvres instead, such as divestment and 
nationalisation of activities (business divisions), where the later turned out to be a costly 
blind alley.68 The institutional reforms altered the competitive dynamics by paving the way 
for more low-cost entrants to enter the market and begin to take market share away from 
traditional airlines such as SAS and British Airways. Budget and other traditional airlines 
started to poach an increasing number of their customers. The late 1990s saw the emergence 
of low-cost airlines such as Ryanair and EasyJet in Europe.  
By 1996, the SAS predictions had failed to materialise and other multiple airlines had 
emerged. SAS, like many other legacy airlines, responded to the threat. In the UK, British 
Airways responded by establishing low-cost subsidiary, Go in 1997, KLM established Buzz 
and Lufthansa acquired a minority stake in Eurowings.69 As part of this changing trend and 
response, SAS announced its plans to establish Snowflake as its low-cost unit. These external 
forces provided the much-needed incentives for the firm to renew. By the early 1980s and 
early 1990s, deregulation and liberalisation had taken root, thereby triggering a range of 
strategic options.  
The µmoment-of-truth¶ philosophy, 1981±1993 
Prior to the arrival of Jan Carlzon as the CEO in 1981, the airline had become a bureaucratic, 
centralised and µfunctionally specialised organization¶ which was no longer suitable for the 
new environment.70 In addition, it was facing headwinds such as poor customer services, 
loss-making operations, delays, low morale of employees and declining market share on its 
core Nordic routes which accounted for the precarious financial position. Furthermore, the 
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µROGPDQDJHUVZHUH WUDSSHGE\ WKHLU VXFFHVV DQGFRXOGQRW FKDQJH « they were technical, 
control-oriented managers focusing on profitabiOLW\ SURGXFWLYLW\ DQG HIILFLHQF\¶71 
Accordingly, the airline was losing around $17 million per annum and had established track-
record delays. As the competitive environment changed, the old ways of competing and 
gaining competitive advantage became unsustainable. As the firm grew in size, it was no 
longer well positioned to LGHQWLI\ DQG UHVSRQG WR FXVWRPHUV¶ GHPDQGV LQ D WLPHO\ PDQQHU 
,QGHHGPXOWLSOHPDQXDOVKDGEHHQSURGXFHG WRJXLGHDQGVKDSHHPSOR\HHV¶EHKDYLRXUEXW
these eventually came to be seen as µrestrictions¶ and constraints on front-OLQHVWDII¶VDELOLW\
WRUHVSRQGWRFXVWRPHUV¶GHPDQGV72 This was surprising given that the rules affected around 
50% of the employees who constituted the µfront-line staff¶. Jan Carlzon made the following 
observations: 
µWe weren't making money at SAS when I came here. We were in a desperate situation, and 
that's the worst time to focus on preventing mistakes and controlling costs. First, we had to 
increase revenues. We had to decide what business we were going to do and go to work on 
the revenue side. Then we could think about cutting costs, because only then would we know 
which costs could be cut without losing competitiveness.¶73 
The change at the top team propelled a fundamental re-thinking of the way the airline 
conducted its operations towards innovation, simplicity and customer services. Service 
quality was seen as a major factor in achieving long-term success. Perhaps the most 
GLVWLQFWLYH IHDWXUH RI WKH UHIRUP ZDV &DUO]RQ¶V µmoment-of-truth¶ philosophy.74 His 
philosophy focused on delivering better encounters between the customer and firm which 
provided an opportunity for an impression to be formed about the business. This philosophy 
VRXJKW WR PDNH QHFHVVDU\ FKDQJHV LQ HPSOR\HHV¶ DWWLWXGHs and structures to create a new 
culture tailored to deliver improved customer satisfaction.75 The strategy entailed improving 
customer service and delivery of services such as reducing delays and queues to help attract 
travellers.  
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Under his leadership, the firm shifted from prior exclusive focus on the so-called 
mundane aspects of air travel towards improving the overall customer experience. It became 
clear to the corporate leaders that µthe battle for the air will have to be fought on the 
ground¶.76 This recognised that quality service was essential in turning the fortunes of the 
airline around. This represented a shift from the system ideology and its focus on production-
based quality towards a service ideology which focused on customer-based quality. Below, 
we explicate the strategic renewal initiatives. 
The shift to become a µdebureaucratised¶ airline 
In addition to the above initiatives, Carlzon also identified the middle management structure 
as one of the main barriers to information flow from the customer to the top-management 
team.77 The front-line employees were not empowered enough to deal with and respond to 
key customers¶ complaints. $WWKHWLPHWKHFRPSDQ\FXOWXUHKDGWUDGLWLRQDOO\µNHSWRXWRIWKH
ZD\RIHPSOR\HHFUHDWLYLW\DQGLQQRYDWLRQLQFXVWRPHUVHUYLFH¶78 In light of this evidence, 
there was a need to realign the firm to its core activities of providing quality air services. This 
meant that a new structure had to be created to help address the issue. He decided to by-pass 
the middle managers by creating direct lines of communication with the front-line 
personnel.79 This paved the way for a new culture that fosters innovation and problem-
solving by front-line personnel.  
One of the rationales for the shift of decisions to the front-line staff was the increasing 
reality tKDWPLGGOHPDQDJHUVZHUH DW WLPHVQRW LQ WXQHZLWK VXGGHQFKDQJHV LQ FRQVXPHUV¶
behaviour. The firm also offered staff development courses to 2,000 key personnel within the 
upper and middle management and a two-day µpersonal service through personal 
development¶ course to all its 10,000 front-line staff.80 At the outset of the reforms, there was 
a rally call to gather around the slogan: µ/HW¶VJHW LQ WKHUHDQGILJKW¶ with the central goals 
and philosophy directly communicated to the employees through videotapes, in-house 
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magazines and in a brochure.81 In order to implement his plan effectively, Carlzon also 
developed a cartoon book which was referred to as µThe Little Red Book¶ to help channel his 
message and vision for the company to the employees. The new routines and beliefs systems 
were communicated through directives and the mission statements of the firm. In order to 
achieve the change needed, the process was supported by clear and simple information. In 
order to accomplish this ambition, the airline invested around $45 million to upgrade its 
resources and capabilities for global competition which included training employees and re-
deploying them into new roles to help improve customer service.82  
In addition, the firm trained and moved some employees µfrom the back office to 
more needed functions closer to the customer/passenger, to provide peripheral services 
(booking, checking, waiting, comfort, attentiveness, etc.) in the front-line delivery-system¶, 
where their expertise could be further utilised to bring about organisational success.83 The 
training helped to equip staff and upgrade their expertise for their new roles within the 
organisation. The firm also decided to establish a corporate college in Copenhagen to train 
individuals within the company in the right sets of skills and expertise needed for success in 
the industry at the time. By the late 1980s, the firm had paved the way for front-line 
employees to µPDNH GHFLVLRQV VR WKDW WKH FXVWRPHU¶V QHHGV ZHUH VDWLVILHG LPPHGLDWHO\¶.84 
This was a shift from the traditional approach where the normal procedure for dealing with 
such matters would have been to refer it to a µsuperior¶ with such responsibilities.  
As part of this strategic initiative, the resources and capabilities of the firm were 
marshalled towards helping the µfront-line¶ improve customer satisfaction. This strategy 
focused mainly on the interactions between line workers, cabin attendants, ticket agents and 
middle management. µNo longer were middle managers to spend their time making sure 
instructions were followed¶.85 One of the outcomes of the changes was a more empowered 
front-line employee with flexibility to deal with numerous customer-related issues and a clear 
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line of responsibilities and authority. As a result of these changes, the airline eventually 
abolished µthe old military¶ organisational structure which often disrupted the flow of 
information from the front-line to the upper echelons of the company.86 The creation of a 
flatter organisational structure paved the way for the firm to become more responsive to the 
needs of its customers as well as reducing customer dissatisfaction. It introduced the concept 
of µPutting People First¶. These changes meant the company then became µdebureaucratised¶ 
which allowed effective communication and flow of information to occur.87 The firm made a 
dramatic shift from largely outmoded methods of dealing with customers towards making 
customer focus a cornerstone of its operations. As a result of the reforms initiated and 
LPSOHPHQWHGXQGHU&DUO]RQ¶VOHDGHUVKLp, the airline returned to profitability in 1982, a year 
after his term of office started. In 1983, the improving customer service helped the airline to 
win Air Transport :RUOG¶V Airline of the Year award and other awards followed.88  
A shift to become the EXVLQHVVPDQ¶Vairline and a global service company 
One of the key factors in triggering strategy renewal was visionary leadership displayed by 
Jan Carlzon. The firm was also confronted with the looming effects of global liberalisation in 
the industry and shrinking response lag, i.e. µthe time it takes competitors to respond 
aggressively enough to erode the competitive advantage¶.89  SAS was forced to introduce new 
services and expand its portfolio of activities as a means of mitigating these threats. The 
strategy was bold and in sharp contrast to the industry trend at the time. This entailed 
diversification into hotels and other services at a time when international rivals such as 
United Airlines and British Airways were rather divesting from hotel and car-rental 
subsidiaries to focus on their core airline business operations.90 This was seen as deviating 
from the status quo to improve its competitiveness. During the early 1980s, as the force of 
liberalisation and competitiveness accelerated, Jan Carlzon launched a new strategy to make 
SAS µWKH EXVLQHVVPDQ¶V DLUOLQH « WKH EHVW DLUOLQH LQ WKH ZRUOG IRU WKH IUHTXHQW EXVLQHVV
traveller¶. The company introduced a new class in the cabin, EuroClass, which turned out to 
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be an effective way of achieving service and price differentiation for increasing the total 
revenues.91  
Up until 1987, the firm operated mainly as an airline which then shifted towards 
becoming a travel company. Carlzon quickly turned his attention to eliminating inefficiencies 
and improving the operations of the business. The goal was also to help attract travellers in 
this niche segment to make it the µWKH EXVLQHVVPDQ¶V DLUOLQH¶. At the time, µconventional 
wisdom called for productivity drives in low market share, high-capacity utilisation 
companies¶.92 In addition to owning hotels and limousine services, the firm expanded the 
scope of these activities under the µtotal travel service¶ strategy by µoffering business 
travellers not just a plane ride but also hotel accommodation, ground transportation and 
speedier check-in services for hotels and flights¶.93 Under his leadership, the airline 
established the world's first separate cabin for business class whilst discontinuing first class 
on its European routes. The new strategy emphasised the business class segment as a route to 
future success. The firm¶V VKLIW WR EHFRPH NQRZQ DV WKH 6FDQGLQDYLDQ EXVLQHVV WUDYHOOHU¶V
airline in the 1980s was followed by a shift towards developing a new corporate identity and 
image.94 The strategy pursued helped to bring customers to the airline at the time when 
competition was surging. The revenue accompanying the increasing customer numbers 
helped to conserve cash. One of the most notable changes was the increasing concentration 
on the niche business traveller market by providing quality services to attract and retain this 
segment of the market.  
During late 1993 and early 1994 it became apparent that the past strategic renewal 
efforts had run their course. By late 1989 and after eight years in office, Carlzon had turned 
the airline from a loss-PDNLQJ RSHUDWLRQ WR EHFRPH RQH RI WKH ZRUOG¶V PRVW SURILWDEOH
airlines.95 By the end of his tenure, the airline¶V culture had been fundamentally transformed 
WRPDNHWKHFRPSDQ\PRUHHIILFLHQWDQGUHVSRQVLYHWRFXVWRPHUV¶QHHGV7KHILUPKDVEeen 
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transformed to become a more customer-focused organisation. To the wider industry, Carlzon 
was regarded as one of the leading thinkers of the industry in bringing about major 
WUDQVIRUPDWLRQV$OWKRXJK&DUO]RQ¶VSODQWRPDNH6$6RQHRIWKHELJILYHDLUOines by 199596 
was not achieved, he transformed the routines and processes of the airline, thereby laying 
foundations towards future success. On the other hand, the wish to be the Airline of the Year 
and then the businessmaQ¶V airline implied a flush of generosity towards claims from the 
labour unions, especially pilots and cabin attendants. As long as the market was regulated, 
increasing employee costs could be covered by higher prices for tickets, thanks to the not-so-
price-sensitive business people. However, in the deregulated market with airlines competing 
on prices, this kind of compensatory strategy was not any longer an option. Thus, in the long 
run costs piled up during the era of Carlzon, strongly jeopardising the chances of being a 
cost-efficient and competitive player in the new deregulated market.97 Table 1 summarises 
the fundamental shifts of philosophy and new activities that came to replace them. 
------------------------------ 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------ 
A shift from organic growth to alliance formation, 1980±1999 
One highlight of the renewal agendas was the extensive growth strategy through strategic 
alliances and collaborative arrangements as a means of sharing risk and obtaining synergistic 
benefits. Prior to this period, the protections and restrictions of new entrants to its key 
markets meant that for SAS, the market grew µautomatically¶ as the economy grew and more 
consumers travelled.98 As the increasing global and regional competitions eroded the key 
sources of competitive advantage in the 1980s, there was a major shift towards alliances as a 
means of staying competitive and in touch with the leading European airlines.99 In 1988, the 
airline forged links with Continental Airlines and Airlines of Britain Holdings. These 
alliances included joint operating agreements in areas such as marketing, check-in and 
baggage handling to help reduce costs as well as ensuring efficient running of the business at 
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a time when the outlook for the industry was bleak. The alliances also offered an opportunity 
for the firm to increase its global reach by expanding beyond the Scandinavian region.100 
Since then, in 1989, following the global shift trend, the airline formed cross-border new 
alliances with airlines such as All Nippon Airways, Swissair, Linea Aerea Nacional de Chile, 
Finnair and Canadian Airlines International.101 Indeed, it was believed that such alliances 
would help SAS to become the so-called µfourth force¶ alongside Air France, Lufthansa and 
British Airways.102 Consequently, in May 1995 the firm forged links with Lufthansa to 
become one of the largest in the airline industry in Europe at the time. One of the unique 
contributions of SAS to the global airline industry has been its role in pioneering the concept 
of global airline alliance groupings.  
On 14 May 1997 following a period of consultation, SAS alongside Lufthansa, Air 
Canada, Thai Airways International and United Airlines became the founding members of the 
Star Alliance network, thereby providing opportunities for members to collaborate and share 
some facilities across airports.103 Indeed, the cooperation between SAS and Thai Airways 
which helped to lay the foundation for the emergence of Star Alliance, goes as far back as 
1958 when SAS became one of the founding members of Thai Airways.104 The formation of 
Star Alliance was seen as a mechanism to allow the firm to expand in geographical routes by 
tapping into the experience of rivals to improve route networks and customer services. 
Immediately after its formation, the tri-national airline started code-sharing with Air Canada 
on key routes. The multiple alliances and code-share agreements were forged under Jan 
6WHQEHUJ¶V OHDGHUVhip to overcome some of the size advantages of airlines such as British 
Airways and Air France. At this VWDJHLQWKHILUP¶VHYROXWLRQLWEHFDPHFOHDUWKDWLQWHU-firm 
alliances had become a means through which the firm could tap into new expertise as well as 
to strengthen and renew its market expansion efforts. In fact, the strategy was more or less the 
norm among the former full carriers, as a response to increased costs (not least fuel costs) and 
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the entrance of low-cost airlines. As part of the renewal efforts, SAS forged more alliances in 
order to save costs, upgrade its market expertise and obtain new capabilities.  
µSAS 2000¶ strategy  
Prior to the arrival of Jan Stenberg as CEO in April 1994, the firm was suffering from the 
post-Gulf War downturn effects which had contributed to the pre-tax losses of around 
SEK3.35 billion from 1990 to 1993.105 The first Gulf War had fundamentally altered the 
business environment leading to weak consumer demand, high oil prices and a surge in 
booking cancellations. Indeed, sales declined by around 12% in the first month of the war as 
many major legacy airlines had lurched further towards bankruptcy and collapse.106 Coming 
into office in the wake of the war was a major challenge given that at least seven US carriers 
had filed for bankruptcy and four liquidated. One of the fundamental cases for reform at the 
outset of his leadership was the need to revitalise the outdated routines and processes to 
become more responsive to changes that accompanied the liberalisation reforms. The new 
CEO VDZVWUDWHJLF UHQHZDODV WKHVROHDQG LQHVFDSDEOHSDWK WRHQVXUH WKH ILUP¶V ORQJ-term 
survival. Jan Stenberg recalled the following conditions upon his arrival: 
µThis company had an awful debt-equity ratio. We were losing money to a degree [that] had 
eroded the equity of the company. For a long time people had been too deeply involved in 
what was called Alcazar, neglecting day-to-day business and the development of the 
company. While they were talking strategic things, tactics were left behind.¶107  
At the time, the executives sought means to help revitalise the firm and alter the 
declining fortunes of the business. Consequently, in 1996 the firm started intensive market 
UHVHDUFK WR EHWWHU XQGHUVWDQG LWV SDVVHQJHUV¶ UHTXLUHPHQWV DQG EHKDYLRXU 7KH HIIRUW ZDV
recognised as the µmost comprehensive database of customer observations in the airline 
industry¶.108 Stemming from the survey was the conclusion that the airline needed to enhance 
the customer experience and improve customer satisfaction. The analysis of the experiences 
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helped to improve its services in areas such as check-in, on-board services and baggage-claim 
transactions. The market research culminated in the formulation of a new strategy.  
In 1998, µ6$6 2000¶ strategy was launched, geared towards delivering improved 
customer interactions and facilities. A key premise of this strategy was to position the airline 
for the 21st century. This renewal strategy also entailed re-branding. In September 1998, the 
delivery of a new Boeing 737 was followed by remaking of the company image which 
include uniforms for workers, new cabin interiors, menus and airport lounges all carefully 
created to position the airline and offering an improved customer experience.109 These 
changes did not emerge from a vacuum but rather they stemmed from customer surveys, 
multiple interviews, observations and videotapes of more thaQ  KRXUV RI SDVVHQJHUV¶
dealings with the firm.110 The acquisition of knowledge on promising areas for cost savings 
helped in shaping the business for the subsequent years. 
Returning to the Scandinavian heritage 
Prior to the 1990s, there was a sense that the airline had lost its unique identity. Therefore, 
there was a need to remake the firm and position it for the 21st century. The new strategy 
emphasised strongly its µproud Scandinavian heritage¶ which was unique to this particular 
firm and had been the only µtruly¶ Scandinavian airline and representative of the three 
countries.111 In this direction, the airport lounges were redesigned to help create a homely 
environment which welcomed customers. The new uniforms introduced also represented a 
shift from the Calvin Klein-designed livery launched in the early 1980s to be replaced by 
Scandinavian designers.112 Consequently, resources were marshalled towards informing 
employees of the need for change in personnel and structure to help bring about future 
success and survival. As part of a number of operations changes were made which included 
painting the fleet and ground equipment.  
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In addition, µpersonnel were attired with new uniforms, and a new logo was designed 
for the office and air carriers ... The whole staff went through a service management 
programme focusing on how the service expectations of the customers should be their service 
experiences in the daily moments of truth¶.113 As part of the strategic renewal actions, a 
decision was made to gradually retire the word µsystem¶ from the official name of the airline. 
It was concluded that the airline represented Scandinavian characteristics such as µsimplicity, 
functionality, informal elegance and respect for materials and resources, befitting the UHJLRQ¶V
legacy¶.114 Indeed, as far back as 1994, µsimplicity, choice and care¶ became the bywords for 
WKHDLUOLQH¶VUHODWLRQVKLSZLWKLWVFXVWRPHUV115  
As part of this new strategy, the food offered by the company was changed to 
incorporate more µScandinavian world cooking¶ with mainly Scandinavian dishes on the 
menus. This was a major step towards turning the fortunes of the airline and making it more 
competitive. The approach emphasised its roots and was in sharp contrast to the approaches 
adopted by other European airlines. For instance, in 1997 British Airways undertook major 
strategic change which de-emphasised %$¶VµBritishness¶ in favour of demonstrating a more 
diverse ethnic and racial make-up of people in its key markets around the world in Africa, 
Asia, Europe and North America.116 Although the strategy deviated from philosophies 
pursued by other airlines, it is worth noting that, at the time, SAS sold around two-thirds of 
all tickets inside the Scandinavia region.117 The new approach also emphasised a clear 
adoption of new µbusiness philosophy¶ which entailed greater employee involvement and 
commitment to help deliver future success. Consequently, the airline was able to µoperate in a 
global market without having a global presence¶ by tapping into the expertise and facilities of 
its partners including its Star Alliance members around the world.118  
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Post-9/11 strategic renewal  
In the years after the liberalisation reforms and the implementation of a total service strategy, 
the firm entered the 1990s in a position of being able to compete more effectively against 
other global airlines. At the dawn of the 21st century, SAS was in a stable financial position 
(see figure 2). Prior to 2001, SAS had made an operating profit every year since 1992. Yet 
this would turn suddenly in 2001 when the airline would report a loss of SEK 1.1 billion.119 
During early 2001, the executives projected µthe dawn of a new era¶120 which would lead to 
further successes and increased capacity. However, the events of 9/11 later in the year altered 
the calculations of the firm. An indication of the precarious position of the airline shown in 
the final quarter 2001 when it posted losses of SEK 2 billion ($214 million) further exerted 
pressure on the business and the need to generate a quick turnaround of the fortunes of the 
business.121 This forced Jørgen Lindegaard, who at the time had just been in the office as 
CEO of the SAS Group for a short period, to announce a renewal strategy which 
encompassed expanding to new markets and eliminating inefficient lines of businesses and 
operations.  
3ULRUWR6$6¶VFRVWEDVHZDVULVLQJDWDQXQVXVWDLQDEOHUDWHKRZHYHUWKLVµwas 
disguised by its growth during the economic boom of the late 1990s.122 Although the firm 
remained the leading player in the Scandinavian region, its dominance had continuously been 
challenged by low-cost new entrants. Indeed, it had begun to lose more market share to them 
and such a renewed effort was required to respond. Following the global economic crisis, 
security concerns and sharp decline of air travel following 9/11, the hidden problems of the 
airline became more obvious which triggered a major renewal strategic initiative to make the 
organisation more responsive to the challenges. The airline responded to the crisis with staff 
reductions, and freezes on recruitment and pay raises. The underlying assumption was that 
co-operation was essential to cost reduction and any efficiency drive.  Under the leadership of 
Lindegaard, the firm seized on opportunities to obtain further synergies by acquiring 
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financially troubled airline, Braathens for $124 million.123 In tandem with the expansion and 
retrenchment strategy, the firm also raised its stake in low-cost carrier, Spanair to 74%, 
costing it $112 million.124 The expertise acquired from its partners and alliance partners 
helped to lay the foundations towards the implementation of the strategy. This was a 
fundamental shift from the previous strategy. As Lindegaard acknowledged: 
µIt is not that we don't want to be the EXVLQHVVPDQ¶Vairline anymore, but we have to change 
according to what the businessman wants ... I GRQ¶Wsee Scandinavian Airlines as anything but 
a full service airline, with cheap products within that concept.¶125  
As the effects of 9/11 became more apparent, the need to reform became more 
pronounced. In an attempt to respond to the 9/11 events, the firm announced a range of 
responses to the crisis to help ensure the survival of the business. The restructuring plans 
included staff reductions of up to 3,600 from 25,200 in tandem with a 15±17% reduction in 
operational capacity of the business and the grounding of 21 planes.126  
As part of /LQGHJDDUG¶Vstrategy, in June 2002 the firm launched Scandinavian Direct 
with the aim of simplifying its fare structure leading to reductions on some domestic and 
intra-Scandinavian routes.127 In 2002, the airline was affected by the downturn in the 
telecommunications sector and Scandinavian economy. This affected business traffic which 
fell by around 15%.128 One of the major challenges facing the business in the early 1990s was 
the need to find ways to improve efficiency by lowering coordination costs and become more 
responsive to the needs of its customers. In an attempt to respond to the downturn, the firm 
responded with its product µScandinavian Direct¶, targeting the domestic market with the 
hope of expanding it to the other key European routes.129 In mid-2001, the SAS/Maersk 
Air price-fixing scandal emerged which affected the reputation of the firm and its ability to 
attract customers. Also, stemming from the scandal was the fine imposed on the firm by the 
European Union.  
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According to the illegal agreement between SAS and Danish carrier Maersk Air, 
Maersk withdrew from the Copenhagen±Stockholm route, while SAS discontinued its 
services on Copenhagen±Venice, Billund±Frankfurt and Copenhagen±Athens and in so doing 
provided a lack of competitive conditions for each of the airlines to artificially charge 
consumers higher prices.130 Both companies were fined by the EU Commission and SAS was 
ordered to pay 39.4 million euros ($36 million).131 One of the key reforms was the 2002 
restructuring of its activities into four new business divisions in an attempt to improve 
efficiency, become more customer-oriented (nationally) and reduce waste.132 This strategy 
was also partly an attempt to respond to the intense competition from low-fare carriers such 
as Ryanair at the time, and SAS tried to ensure effective links between the parent and the 
offspring. During his time in office, Jørgen Lindegaard articulated a coherent vision aimed at 
turning the fortunes of the firm around by eliminating loss-making operations.  
In August 2006, Lindegaard left; Gunnar Reitan then temporarily held the office and 
Mats Jansson took leadership of SAS from 2007 to 2010. There was a need for the business 
to shift towards µa new customer-oriented business culture¶ to help improve the 
competitiveness of the business and its ability to attract and retain customers.133 The major 
shift from Jan Carlzon to Jan Stenberg and then Jørgen Lindegaard was the shift from being 
the µthe EXVLQHVVPDQ¶Vairline¶ to a µcost-oriented airline¶ as key to a sustainable competitive 
advantage. The firm was to pursue a hybrid strategy which included low cost and low service 
alongside the quality services used to attract the business travellers. This was not solely a 
low-FRVW FRPSDQ\ EXW UDWKHU LW UHSUHVHQWHG GLYHUVLILFDWLRQ RI WKH ILUP¶V SRUWIROLR RI
companies and their strategies in their key markets. The firm sought to make it indispensable 
by offering multiple ranges of products and delivering to meet the needs of business and 
leisure travellers. 
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Divestment as a route to strategic renewal, 2008±2009 
At this stage, SAS decided to reverse its earlier strategy of diversification and spin off some 
activities to focus more on its core business. The root of the matter was that it had 
overextended itself into multiple activities which needed to be pruned. Divestment was seen 
as a means of re-GHSOR\LQJ WKHILUP¶VUHVRXUFHVDQGH[SHUWLVH WRZDUGV LWVDLUOLQHRSHUDWLRQV
and route network. Divestment was a major part of the wider strategy called µStrategy 2011¶ 
and µCore SAS¶ in 2008 which sought to eliminate loss-making routes, businesses and to 
focus on new growth markets in Europe and elsewhere.134 At the core of these strategies was 
the achievement of cost savings of SEK 2.7bn in the three years to 2011.135 One of the 
distinctive cases was Spanair. It was formed by SAS in 1986 as a charter airline offering air 
services via mainland Spain to the Balearic Islands.136 Although Spanair expanded its route 
network in the 1990s to include trans-Atlantic services to countries such the United States 
and Mexico, the underlying performance was weak and the operations remained largely 
unprofitable.137 In 2008, the disposal of Spanair was estimated to cost SAS around SEK 
4.9bn ($585m) in restructuring costs and write-downs.138 In 2009, the firm sold its 80.1% 
VWDNHLQWKHEHOHDJXHUHG6SDQDLUWR&DWDODQLQYHVWRUVIRUDQRPLQDO¼, signalling an end to its 
major involvement in the operations of the loss-making airline. The offloading of Spanair 
was unsurprising given that in 2008 the firm attempted to sell its stake. However, it was 
unable to find a suitable buyer to meet the estimated value of $600m.139  
Despite the sale of the majority of its stake, the firm retained 19.9% and assisted in 
implementing a new strategic plan.140 Due to worsening business conditions such as high oil 
prices and inability to generate an effective turnaround, Spanair collapsed in January 2012 
with 3,161 employees losing their jobs. Around 8,600 employees were affected under the 
µCore SAS¶ strategy with around 3,000 job losses linked to offload stakes in entities such as 
Spanair. In less than 20 years, the number of employees in the SAS Group was reduced from 
40,000 in the early 1990s to 14,000 persons in 2012. The sale of Spanair was immediately 
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followed by WKH VDOH RI LWV  VWDNH LQ LWV /DWYLDQ DIILOLDWH $LU%DOWLF WR WKH DLUOLQH¶V
management for SEK 220m.141  
In late 2009, the firm also announced the sale of its 20% stake in British 
Midland/BMI to Lufthansa for a £38 million ($61 million) upfront payment, with further 
installments to follow.142 The decision to offload the stake in BMI goes as far back as 1989 
and paved the way for the firm to redeploy its attention and resources away from the 
struggling British airline towards strengthening its operations in the Nordic region. In 2009, 
the airline also announced divestment from companies such as Estonian Air which followed 
the earlier decision to offload the stakes in Spanair and Air Baltic. SAS had sought to reduce 
capacity to focus on profitable business routes by axing 16 aircraft from its main fleet ± two 
long hauls and 14 short hauls. This was part of a wider strategy to re-orient the company 
towards the opportunities inherent in the Scandinavian market whilst concurrently reducing 
losses stemming from under-capacity on some routes. In all, it sought to reduce the number 
of routes by 40% and capacity by a fifth.143 These actions were a reversal of the expansion 
strategy of the two decades preceding 2008, where the firm expanded to Spain, the UK and 
the Baltic States as a means of gaining market share. They were also in sharp contrast to the 
wave of consolidation that was occurring in the industry as airlines sought to forge new 
alliances and mergers to help overcome the effects of the global economic crisis in 2008. The 
renewal strategy at this point recognised the need to terminate loss-making operations and 
concentrate on core markets and business passengers.144 
By 2009, the capital situation was critical and the board had to come up with a 
solution in order to avoid bankruptcy. If the company had been following common practices 
of accounting, it would have been insolvent long before 2009, according to Fritz Schur, 
chairman of Scandinavian Airlines.145 After an issue of preferred shares of SEK 6 billion, the 
firm was able to avoid going bankrupt. Also, the new strategy programme launched in 2009, 
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the Core SAS, included savings of SEK 4.5 billion. But the reports continued to show red 
figures and in early 2010 there was a need for further cuts. At one point CEO Mats Jansson 
declared: µIn a month, we have no money to pay any salaries¶. The situation was solved with 
another issuing of shares equating to SEK 5 billion.146 In addition to the above reforms, the 
firm also decided to abandon its attempt to decentralise the management structure. This was 
surprising given that five years earlier, the airline had split the operations into 
autonomous Norwegian, Swedish and Danish airlines ± each with responsibility for their 
country.147 This recognised that the previous µexperiment¶ was unsuitable and a return to the 
previous centralised management system was required.148 These strategic renewals were 
JHDUHGWRZDUGVHQVXULQJHIILFLHQWDOORFDWLRQRIWKHILUP¶VH[LVWLQJUHVRXUFHVZKLOVWUHGXFLQJ
waste and tapping into opportunities in new markets.  
In November 2012, Scandinavian Airlines experienced another severe liquidity crisis. 
The company had to convince their creditors that they could achieve positive results in the 
future, in order to be able to re-new their loans. After ultimatums and threats of bankruptcy 
by the management, the pilot and cabin crew unions finally signed contracts with historically 
significant concessions regarding wages, hours of work and pensions. The financial stress 
also called for forced sell-offs, e.g. of the profitable airline Widerøe, and outsourcing of parts 
of the ground service. Figure 2 illustrates the downward trend in profits and an increasing 
problem with low profitability.  
------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
------------------------------ 
Based on the above analysis, we uncovered that strategic renewal attempts by the firm 
are manifest through broadly four distinct stages (see Figure 3). Stage 1 includes identifying 
problems regarding internal and external factors, such as performance decline, misallocation 
of resources and waste. Stage 2 entails mobilising support of key stakeholders for the 
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strategic initiative. The stage also involves identifying key individuals such as employees and 
trade unions. Stage 3 includes devising and introducing new ways of revitalising and/or 
UHSODFLQJ SDVW URXWLQHV DQG SURFHVVHV VHHQ WR KDYH FRQVWUDLQHG WKH ILUP¶V DFWLRQV RU
perpetuated bad behaviours. Stage 4 entails taking steps to embed the new routines and 
processes within the fabric or cultures of the organisations. Successful strategic renewal 
efforts would lead to business longevity. Figure 3 demonstrates the complex processes and 
stages involved in strategic renewal initiation and implementation.  
------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 3 about here 
------------------------------ 
Conclusion and discussion  
In this paper, we sought to examine the strategic renewal initiatives of SAS from 1946 to 
2012. The history of SAS is a good illustration of a distinctive feature of the Scandinavian 
business environment, i.e. it is deeply rooted in the cooperation between the state and market 
giving rise to a hybrid organisation.149  The study revealed that when SAS encountered a 
hostile environment stemming from liberalisation, deregulation and financial pressures, it 
discarded past unproductive and unprofitable behaviours and actions to make way for a 
customer-oriented organisation to emerge. The revitalisation efforts during the 1980s helped 
to transform the airline to become more customer focused and attract business customers. The 
old model of the firm was eventually superseded by a µservice logic model¶and routines to 
revitalise the business. The µrevitalisation efforts¶ are rather an illustration of episodic 
change150 and quantum change151 well-developed in the literature. This is highly relevant 
given that episodic changes are infrequent, discontinuous and intentional. 152 As our case 
demonstrate, the changes were precipitated by both internal and external factors including 
changes in the top management team (µprime mover¶), poor customer services and market 
competition. Thus, our analysis further contribute to the behavioural theory of the firm153 by 
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deepening our understanding how firms adapt and respond to environmental changes through 
the actions of its leaders.  
Our work suggests that the strategic initiatives adopted and advocated by the top-
management team such as the µtotal travel service¶ and µSAS 2000¶ helped to ensure its 
longevity. Our analysis suggests that the environmental conditions at the stDUWRIHDFK&(2¶V
tenure had profound effects on the nature and extent of the strategic renewal initiative. We 
interpret this as a response from the owners towards the perceived current market situation at 
that particular time. The response from the owners thus came from hiring a new CEO with 
managerial skills required for each new market situation. However, it is important to 
emphasise that without substantial capital injections from the three Scandinavian 
governments and the major private owner (the Wallenberg Group), as well as further credits 
from the banks, the company would not exist today. Thus, our work demonstrates that mixed 
ownership was a strategic asset in helping to gain legitimacy and ensuring the longevity of 
the organisation.  
Notwithstanding the 50% stake of the three nations, the strategic renewal efforts have 
ODUJHO\ EHHQ XQGHUWDNHQ LQ FORVH LQWHUDFWLRQ EHWZHHQ WKH JRYHUQPHQWV¶ LQYROYHPHQW DQG
interventions. The Consortium Agreement was important in several aspects and can be seen 
as an illustration of initial strategic decisions, which influenced paths for a long period of 
time, although the mixed ownership between the three countries was also a source of 
problems, as demonstrated. The initiated and implemented strategic renewal processes had a 
long-lasting legacy of altering the firm behaviour and approaches to customer service and 
marketing. Thus, these finding highlights the steps and approaches adopted by the firm as it 
sought to create and capture value for the owners. These also emphaVLVHGRQWKHµGLVFRYHU\¶
RI D QHZ EXVLQHVV PRGHO LQ 6$6 DV EDVLV IRU GHYHORSLQJ DQG VWUHQJWKHQLQJ RI WKH ILUP¶V
competitiveness advantage in the marketplace. Indeed, the renewal led to the development of 
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new capability to overcome erosion of traditional sources of competitive advantage. Our 
findings closely mirror the µbusiness model innovation¶concept - innovative means to create 
and capture value for the stakeholders of the business. 154 
Contributions to theory 
The study makes several contributions to the literature on business history and strategic 
management. First, although the questions on how and why some companies survive over 
time have remained at the cornerstone of contemporary strategic management research155, the 
historical trajectory in this process has been largely overlooked.156 %\ H[DPLQLQJ 6$6¶V
strategic renewal activities, we provide the specification of the role of the state in aiding or 
hindering the progress of such firms. The study also provide unique insights into how 
decision-makers¶ characteristics such as visionary leadership and innovativeness displayed by 
Jan Carlzon and Jørgen Lindegaard, influence strategic renewal activities. In so doing, we 
shed light on the effects of resourced-based factors and WKHXSSHUHFKHORQV¶SHUVSHFWLYH. 157 
OXUILQGLQJVDOVROHQGVXSSRUWWRWKHWKHRUHWLFDOFRQWHQWLRQWKDWORQJHYLW\VWHPVIURPILUPV¶
ability to develop and respond to change in their competitive arenas158.  
Although strategic renewal has been advocated as essential for organisational 
success159, our understanding of the underlying drivers and processes remain limited. Our 
study offers a phase model which delineates the strategic renewal process and consequently 
business longevity, as shown in Figure 3. Thus, we also demonstrated the influence of the 
organisational adaptation and environmental selection factors on the strategic renewal 
activities. The study also reinforces the findings by past study160 that incumbent firms that 
strategically renewed themselves prior to or during market reform such as deregulation 
enhance their chances of developing the size of their networks and revenue streams.  
Furthermore, we contribute to the literature on µstate-owned enterprises¶ by examining the 
close interplay between private and state owners, the management of SAS and the creditors. 
35 
Another important contribution in this respect is the important interaction between owners, 
creditors, and management in terms of strategic renewal. Our case study illustrates the 
importance of bringing in the historical complexity in a case with three states, private 
interests, and banks interacting with various managements of SAS in the three Scandinavian 
countries. The case of SAS contributes to our knowledge of a strategic renewal initiatives and 
how they unfold in the civil aviation industry by suggesting the importance of discussing both 
the actions of management as well as actions by the owners.161  
Another contribution stems from our delineation of the influence and role of state 
RZQHUVKLS DQG PDQDJHULDO LQLWLDWLYHV VXFK DV µ6$6 ¶ DQG µWRWDO WUDYHO VHUYLFH¶ LQ
contributing to business longevity. Thus, our study contributes to the strategic management 
literature on public sector organisation162 by deepening our understanding of how the 
minimal involvement of the states (owners) created space for the various chief executives to 
pursue commercial goals. Thus, according to our view, this enhanced the survival chances of 
the business. 
Regarding practical implications, since the network of flight routes is usually not 
perceived as a natural monopoly in the same way as the rail network, where initial costs (with 
the exception of airports) are significantly lower, there is no theoretical support for keeping 
SAS in state ownership, after the deregulation. However, the Scandinavian countries have a 
long tradition of a symbiotic relationship between the state and private business, and SAS is 
not the only state-owned company that has outlasted the wave of privatisation of firms with 
more or less monopoly power. Since SAS is embedded in Scandinavian welfare institutions, 
its utility will be assessed against national and regional policies, aside from its contingent 
commercial benefits to the economy and the taxpayers. The case of Finnair is interesting in 
relation to SAS, especially in terms of state-private interests (majority of Finnair is state-
owned), and the specific history of Finnair in relation to SAS.) 
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 Notwithstanding the contributions and implications, there are certain limitations 
which must be noted. First, it is worth noting that there is no single path of strategic renewal. 
Such crude generalisation is more likely to obscure complexities inherent in how 
organisations enrich their routines, processes and systems of organising to achieve 
sustainable competitive advantage. Our analysis recognises that organisations are likely to 
chart their own unique strategic renewal paths to achieve longevity. Future research should 
seek a sample of firms across multiple industries to develop a more comprehensive model of 
strategic renewal that has been achieved in this study. Future research could also examine 
how airlines can learn further from renewal strategies of MFCs. Such analysis has potential to 
LQIRUP VFKRODUO\ GLVFRXUVH RQ KRZ RUJDQLVDWLRQV FDQ OHDUQ IURP WKHLU DQG RWKHUV¶
experiences.163  
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Table 1: Key features of strategic renewal actions and service activities  
Nature of 
problem 
Old SAS and old habits prior to 
Carlzon 
Strategic renewal: New activities/re-
orientation during and after Carlzon 
Communication 
channels 
x Lack of effective and limited 
line of communication 
between frontline officers and 
top-management team. 
x Organisational cultural barriers 
to effective flow of 
information. 
x Created new channels of 
communication by by-passing the 
middle managers to create direct 
lines of communication. 
x Effective information sharing 
among employees. 
x Emphasis on quality services, 
responsibility and authority to front-
line staff to solve problems. 
Perception of 
the business 
x The firm had a reputation for 
poor-quality service, delays 
and bureaucratic organisation. 
x Inferior services offered by the 
business. 
x The firm launched new strategic 
vision around services. 
x Became structured small egalitarian 
groups with more widespread 
delegation. 
x SAS EHFDPH(XURSH¶VPRVW
punctual airline shortly after the 
changes were implemented.   
Organisational 
decline 
x Lack of clear strategic 
direction.  
x Galvanising the firm¶V resources and 
capability to help bring about 
renewal. 
x Generosity towards claims from the 
labour unions.  
Strategic focus x ³6WXFNLQWKHPLGGOH´± lack of 
clear direction. 
x Focused more on business traveller. 
x Renewed expertise of managers. 
x Executive commitment to changing 
the corporate culture towards a more 
quality service provider. 
Market 
orientation  
x The airline was largely 
regarded as a production-
oriented airline. 
x Multiple specialist functions 
were created to manage assets, 
but rather encourage strategic 
persistence across the 
organisation. 
x SAS was renewed and became a 
market-oriented service firm.  
x Developed and maintained a 
customer service culture. These 
actions became routinized within the 
firm. 
x Building a stronger brand through 
aesthetic innovations, 1983 and 
1998. 
Environment 
and  scanning 
activities 
x Largely reactive organisation.  
x Volatile environments and 
increasing competitive 
pressures from rival airlines. 
 
x Proactive organisation with an 
upgraded ability to scan and identify 
key sources of opportunities and 
threats. 
x Ability to detect future changes.  
x Changing status quo and revitalise 
the firm¶V strategy. 
Data sources: synthesised by the authors from: Bennis, 1991; Ketelhohn et al., 1991; SAS, 2014; 
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